The notion of 'power of judgement' in the title of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement is commonly taken to refer to a cognitive power inclusive of both determining judgement and reflecting judgement. I argue, first, that this seemingly innocuous view is in conflict both with the textual fact that Kant attempts a critical justification of the reflecting power of judgement -only -and with the systematic impossibility of a transcendentally grounded determining power of judgement. The conventional response to these difficulties is to point out that, Kant's systematic ambitions in the third Critique notwithstanding, reflection, qua concept-forming synthesis, is too closely tied to determination to be a cognitive power in its own right. I argue, second, that this response is question-begging, since the notion of reflection it employs is not only not one central to the third Critique but one antecedently tied to the understanding. I argue, third, that Kant's discussion, in the pivotal § § 76-7, of our cognitive relation to sensible particularity addresses an epistemic problem present (but not raised) in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is the problem of the synthesizability, qua absolute unity, of unsynthesized intuitions. Solving this problem requires critical justification of a principle of reflection. It follows that Kant's systematic ambitions in the third Critique are appropriate. Given the problem Kant seeks to address, he must offer what he takes himself to be offering: a Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgement.
Introduction
According to a view commonly held in the literature on Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant's notion of 'power of judgement' in the Critique's title does not refer to a cognitive capacity fundamentally distinct from the eponymous power Kant had discussed several years earlier in the Critique of Pure Reason. In particular, the central novelty in the third Critique -Kant's recognition of a new 'reflecting power of judgment' (Kant 2000: 67; KU, 5.180, passim) 1 -is not supposed to herald the advent of
The Determining Power of Judgement
In order to understand the cognitive role that the reflecting power of judgement is supposed to play in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, it will be helpful to begin by Forthcoming in: Kantian Review 17. 2 (2012) 6 considering the cognitive role Kant there accords the determining power of judgement.
For this, it will, in turn, be helpful to consider the cognitive role Kant accords the determining power of judgement's precursor -namely, the as yet unqualified 'power of judgement' -in the Critique of Pure Reason.
The Power of Judgement in the Critique of Pure Reason
According to Kant's 
presentation in the Analytic of Principles of the Critique of
Pure Reason, the cognitive role of the power of judgement is to apply the abstract rules supplied by our faculty of concepts (the understanding) 'in concreto' (Kant 1998: 269;  A134/B173). First, where the abstract rules of the understanding are a priori concepts (as in the case of the categories or of mathematical concepts), a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of those concepts is also given a priori (see A67/B92). This set of conditions, accordingly, constitutes a set of rules for the application of rules. In the case of transcendental logic, these are the 'sensible conditions under which pure concepts of the understanding can alone be used' (Kant 1998: 270;  A136/B175). Kant presents these rules as well as the judgements that 'derive a priori under these conditions' (ibid.) in the first Critique's chapters on schematism and on the axioms of the understanding, respectively. When the power of judgement thus stands 'under universal transcendental laws, given by the understanding … the law is sketched out for it a priori and it is therefore unnecessary for it to think of a law for itself in order to be able to subordinate the particular in nature to the universal' (Kant 2000: 67; KU, 5.179, emphasis mine) . In its a priori use, then, the power of judgement has no principle of its own.
Forthcoming in: Kantian Review 17. 2 (2012) 7 Second, where the abstract concepts of the understanding are empirical concepts, no principles governing their use can, moreover, be given at all. This is so, because there can be no a priori rules by which to judge whether an object falls under a given empirical concept in concreto -and because a demand for empirical rules by which to judge whether an object falls under a given empirical concept would lead to an evident regress of rules (A133/172B; KU, 5.169). Accordingly, Kant declares the capacity for applying empirical concepts to objects 'a special talent, which cannot be learned, but only practiced' (Kant 1998: 268 ; A133/B172). In its empirical use, then, the power of judgement has no principle of its own, either.
The power of judgement thus operates either with a borrowed principle, or with no principle at all -but never with a transcendental principle of its own. Accordingly, the power of judgement plays a peculiar role in Kant's system of transcendental logic in the first Critique. Lacking the requisite principled grounding, it cannot be considered a proper transcendental-logical analogue to our empirical-psychological capacity to judge.
Consequently, transcendental logic does not run entirely parallel to general logic (A131/B170), whose division into an analytic of 'concepts, judgments, and inferences' (Kant 1998: 267 ; A130/B169) neatly coincides with the division of our cognitive psychology into 'understanding, power of judgment, and reason' (ibid.). By contrast, Kant has little choice but to assign the purported 'transcendental power of judgment' (Kant 1998: 268; A132/B171, caption) to the transcendental use of the understanding:
'We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging' (Kant 1998: 205;  A69/B94, emphases mine). Judgement, his assessment of the prospects for a critical justification of the power of judgement has undergone a significant transformation. Kant now characterizes 'the power of judgment as an a priori legislative faculty' (Kant 2000: 66; KU, 5.179, caption) and proposes a genuinely 'transcendental principle' (Kant 2000: 68; KU, 5.181, caption) for it. 2 Two factors help explain how this change in judgement's transcendental fortunes comes about.
First, Kant now discerns a new cognitive capacity within the power of judgement at large. He begins by explaining that the power of judgement 'overall' (überhaupt ; Kant 2000: 66; KU, 5.179 ) is the capacity to establish and endorse subsumption-relations between universals and particulars. It is the 'capacity of thinking the particular as contained under the universal' (ibid.). He then distinguishes two ways in which this can be accomplished: either by descending from the universal to the particular, or by ascending from the particular to the universal. Kant explains that judgement consists in the former, analytical (KU, 5.407) descent to particularity, '[i] f the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given' (ibid.). And he notes that, where the universal is thus given, 'the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it … is determining' (ibid. ' (ibid.) . This second way of 'thinking the particular as contained under the universal' is more perplexing than the first, principally because, as presented, the notion of an 'ascent to universality' is ambiguous between an empirical-psychological reading and a transcendental-logical one (see 3.2, below). As a preliminary guide to Kant's distinction, however, we may simply say that, while determining judgement is associated with the application of concepts, reflecting judgement appears to be associated with the formation of concepts. It is the power of judgement in the latter, reflecting employment, for which Kant proposes a transcendental principle in the third Critique (KU, 5.184, 186) .
Second, while this turn to reflection does not, of itself, stop the threat of a regress (prima facie, rules for the formation of rules threaten no less of a regress than rules for the application of rules), the proposed principle for the reflecting power of judgement is, moreover, of a unique sort. It is not an objective rule for judging whether a given concept is the appropriate concept to be formed under given circumstances (KU, 5.169), but a subjective rule that guides the reflecting power of judgement in the formation of concepts, no matter the circumstances. The principle's distinctive characteristic is its procedural nature as a judgement-determining principle. As a second-order methodological principle with no ontological import of its own, it threatens no regress of first-order rules.
Given that at least one dimension of the cognitive role of the power of judgement (namely, reflecting judgement) is thus supposedly backed by transcendental principle, Kant can now consider reason a 'faculty of cognition' (Kant 2000: 83; KU, 5.198) in its own right, with a transcendental principle and a 'domain' (freedom or 'the practical') within which it is duly legislative (KU, 5.168). Add to this the proposed critical grounding of the power of judgement, and Kant can claim to have arrived -in perfect architectonic simplicity -at a Critique of (the faculty of) concepts, a Critique of (the faculty of) judgement, and a Critique of (the faculty of) reason (KU, 5.198). Forthcoming in: Kantian Review 17.2 (2012) 11 Yet, even in this somewhat airbrushed picture, the determining power of judgement cuts an awkward figure. For, Kant is perfectly explicit that its status remains unchanged in the wake of the introduction and critical grounding of a reflecting power of judgement. First, in its empirical use, the determining power of judgement necessarily remains as principle-less as it ever was (KU, 5.169). Second, in its transcendental use, the determining power of judgement continues to be heteronomous (ibid.). The determining power of judgement therefore cannot be subject to transcendental critique.
That this is indeed Kant's position is evident, moreover, from his continued association of determining judgement with the use of the understanding. In his extended discussion of the nature of our understanding in § § 76-7, Kant repeatedly explains that the determining use of the power of judgement -namely, the analytic descent from the universal to the particular -is, in fact, an operation of the understanding. Kant's discussion, in these sections, stands in the service of exposing a certain shortfall of the understanding. But along with Kant's diagnosis that the understanding, unaided by a transcendentally grounded reflecting power of judgement, cannot do its job of determining the particular (see section 4, below), it becomes fully evident just what the indigenous job of the understanding is supposed to be -namely, determining the particular. Determining judgement remains firmly identified with an exercise of the faculty of concepts: 'Our understanding, namely, has the property that in its cognition, e.g., of the cause of a product, it must go from the analytical universal (from concepts) to the particular (of the given empirical intuition) …' (Kant 2000: 276; KU, 5.407 
The Reflecting Power of Judgement
Commentators generally find this conclusion hard to accept. To be sure, 'Kant's intent to introduce a distinct transcendental principle for judgement in its reflective capacity' (Allison 2001: 18 ) is usually acknowledged. But this concession is inexorably followed by the cautionary note that reading too much systematic significance into Kant's intent risks missing the bigger philosophical picture. That bigger picture is then construed in one or another of three different ways. The first and most popular of these is the suggestion mentioned that all theoretical judgement contains a 'moment' of reflection, hence, that reflection and determination cannot be nearly as fundamentally distinct as Kant's 'intent' would (mis-) lead one to believe (Allison 2001: 18; Longuenesse 1998: 163; Guyer 2005: 12) . A second conception of the bigger picture is that the exercise of the reflecting power of judgement is ultimately governed by (hence, that reflecting judgement is subservient to) reason (Horstmann 1989: 172f.) . A third conception runs parallel to the second, except that the imagination is put in charge (Kukla 2006: 12 Beatrice Longuenesse (1998: 163-6, 195-7) , and Henry Allison (2001: Ch. 1-2) . The most straightforward version of the idea is Guyer's. On his tolerant account, not all judgements are both determining and reflecting. Judgements in which 'only two terms are involved' (e.g., demonstrative judgements in which a universal, such as '_is white', is directly related to an empirical intuition) are 'either determinant or reflective but not both' (Guyer 2005: 12) . Which one it is depends on whether the universal in question is antecedently given or has yet to be found. In more complex cases, however, where an antecedently given universal (e.g., 'causation') can only be applied to a sensible particular through 'intermediate concepts' (e.g., specific causal laws) that 'have to be discovered' (ibid.),
Guyer believes that 'reflective judgment may be needed to find those concepts and thus complete the task assigned to determinant judgment' (ibid. Critique on its head. More importantly, when followed through to its natural conclusion (see section 4, below), this reversal of explanatory strategy issues in a decidedly negative answer to the question pursued here: the type of concept-forming reflection at issue in the evocatively, the 'specter … of "empirical chaos"' (Allison 2001: 38) . And he contends that Kant, in the third Critique, realized that exorcising this specter requires that our inductive procedures, too, be transcendentally justified.
The problem, of course, is that Hume did just fine with an inductive justification of the inductive principle and it is unclear why anything more should -or how more could -be required. The belief that nature supports inductive inferences may have considerable heuristic value (the practices of modern science embody it), but it is hardly a condition of the possibility of experience. This has prompted Guyer to conclude that, without importing substantive premises that are decidedly not part of Kant's argument, Kant's attempted justification of our inductive capacities must be considered a failure (Guyer 2005: 68; 1997: 43) .
Sensing that Kant's answer to Hume has to consist in more than wanton exorcisms and transcendental foot-stomping, Allison explains that the threat that Kant's transcendental grounding of our concept-forming procedures in the third Critique is supposed to address is not simply the contingency of empirical generalizations with respect to transcendental laws. Rather, Allison notes that in his recapitulation of the transcendental deduction of the principle of purposiveness in § §76-7 Kant addresses the 'even more fundamental [and] endemic … contingency that the "particular, as such" (als ein solches) has with respect to the universal supplied by the understanding' (Allison 2001: 38) . We may, in short, observe a deepening, over the course of the third Critique, in Kant's conception of the threat that needs transcendental address. It evolves from a problem about the contingency of a given particular with respect to a given universal -to (Longuenesse 1998: 206) . Transcendental syntheses, on this view, are presupposed in all efforts at concept formation (Longuenesse 1998: 196) . Whether the task is to go 'from the particular to the universal' or 'from the particular as such to the universal as such', the same synthetic capacities are arguably in play.
But if the synthetic ascent for which Kant, in the third Critique, seeks transcendental grounding really is, as Allison proposes, the ascent to universality 'from the particular as such', then, given that this is an ascent accomplished by the 'synthesis of the imagination', we must ask what the newfound need in the third Critique for grounding that synthetic activity transcendentally can possibly consist in. Remember that in the first Critique the imagination was a 'blind but indispensable function of the soul' (Kant 1998: 211 ; A78/B103) whose operations could not be further grounded without launching a regress not unlike the one discussed above (see 2.1). (Allison 2001: 41) .
And yet, despite these reassurances, Allison's account remains inconclusive. This here (but see section 5, below). Instead, I will now discuss the specific philosophical problem that the 'particular as such' poses (4.1), and present an argument to the effect that this is not only the problem Kant addresses in § § 76-7, but a problem that demands being solved in a Critique of the (Reflecting) Power of Judgement (4.2).
The Problem of the Synthesizability of Unsynthesized Intuitions
There is indeed a specter lurking in the shadows of the relation between our synthetic capacities and the 'particular as such'. It is a problem that, albeit present in the In his discussion of the 'particular as such' in the third Critique -i.e., of empirical intuition not considered 'qua spatiotemporal entity or event' (hence, not considered subject to spatial, temporal, categorial, let alone empirical determinations) -Kant revisits (Kant 1998: 228 ; A99) then the manifold of an intuition 'could never be anything other than absolute unity' (ibid.). It follows that the 'particular as such' -qua unsynthesized manifold of an intuition -must be considered an absolute unity. The problem is that something that must be considered an absolute unity, cannot then be considered capable of being 'run through' and 'held together' -at least not without further argument. The circumstance that (metaphysically) this absolute unity 'contains a manifold in itself', helps little, so long as (epistemically) that manifold is beyond our reach.
One will object that the transcendental imagination needs neither antecedent prompt nor roadmap and will, simply by dint of its spontaneous epistemic activity, come across the elements that, ex hypothesi, are metaphysically there to be run through and held together. Yet -and this, I propose, is Kant's foundational insight in the third Critique -while this is an accurate description of the transcendental-logical process of synthesizing intuitive manifolds, it is not a full transcendental accounting of its epistemic cost.
The spontaneous activity of 'running through and holding together' has a relational structure (it is a 'running from__through__to__' and a 'holding__together with__'). Even granting that the relata entering into the relation can in fact be identified only in and through the synthetic activity itself, the possibility of this synthetic activity requires more than blind spontaneity and the metaphysical assumption that a manifold 
5.407).
That Kant, in § 77, is principally concerned with particular objects and events (specifically, organisms and organic processes), accordingly, does not entail that it is no longer possible -or indeed necessary -to keep the general epistemic considerations on which Kant's argument is based distinct from the specific teleological use to which these considerations are now being put. formed. Instead, Kant claims that the (unaided) understanding 'determines nothing' in the particular precisely in its indigenous operation of bringing extant analytic universals to bear on the particular in fully formed empirical judgements ('in its cognition, e.g., of the cause of a product'). As Kant puts it in the first of the three passages that make the point:
'through the universal of our (human) understanding the particular is not determined' ( . And while the understanding certainly fails to supply the matter of its intuition and, hence, to make its objects actual, the inability of our discursive intellect to accomplish this last type of determination (characteristic of certain forms of intuitive intellection) hardly amounts to an epistemic problem within critical philosophy.
A first step toward unraveling the mystery of our understanding's alleged utter inability to determine the manifoldness of the given empirical intuition is to understand that manifoldness in the metaphysical sense Kant contemplates in the A-deduction. That this is the correct approach is evident, given Kant's appeal to the cognition of a contrasting, intuitive intellect, immediately following his account of our understanding's But then the manifoldness to which the intuitive intellect has unmediated, nonsynthetic access, cannot be spatio-temporally synthesized manifoldness (i.e., it cannot be our own transcendental imagination's 'manifoldness represented as manifoldness').
Instead, this manifoldness to which our own intellect has access only through representing it as manifoldness (i.e., synthesizing it) must be the manifoldness that, metaphysically speaking, an intuition 'contains … in itself' (Kant 1998: 228; A 99) .
Thus, it is the metaphysical reality of 'the manifoldness [of the given empirical intuition]', apart from our synthetic representation of this manifoldness as manifoldness, progress on the transcendental-logical road to cognition. Second, if we take the complaint to express the maximalist worry (which so exercised the idealists) that we have no independent criterion by which to judge that the understanding's determinations fix any ultimate truths (i.e., the worry that the understanding does not ever truly determine objects), then the response must surely be that aspirations to absolute knowledge have no place in a duly critical epistemology. In the end, then, there seems to be no sense in The principal instance, in the third Critique, of the idea of comparing given representations with one's cognitive faculty in the service of conceptual cognition is the foundational assumption -necessarily inscribed into the structure of the transcendental imagination's spontaneous syntheses themselves -of the synthesizability of sensible particularity. For, this assumption just is the comparison or 'holding together' of sensible particularity (ex hypothesi considered as yet unsynthesized or 'as such') with our faculty of concepts (specifically, with its structural demand for discrete, re-identifiable relata) in regard of a concept thereby made possible, i.e., with the aim of enabling conceptual cognition. Unlike determining synthesis, which can only address the elements of a given sensible manifoldness (comparing them with each other in concreto), reflecting synthesis 
Conclusion: Intuitive Intellection, Aesthetics, Teleology
One may wonder whether my conception of the epistemic problem the reflecting power of judgement is tasked with overcoming in the third Critique brings our cognitive capacities into undue proximity to the type of intuitive intellection Kant ostensibly intended as their principal contrast. It will be helpful, in conclusion, to identify two salient differences.
First, intuitive intellection of the sort Kant discusses in § 77 cannot meaningfully be described as synthetic (if for no other reason than that we cannot give a positive characterization of it at all). By contrast, the reflecting assumption of the synthesizability of unsynthesized sensible particularity is, as we have seen, very much a synthetic, combinatorial act.
Second, the intuitive intellect's operation as it were contains the proof of its own success within itself. Its immediate totalizing vision of a given manifoldness metaphysically present in intuition would, wherever exercised, leave no room for residual questions about whether such a manifoldness were actually, metaphysically present. By contrast, the reflecting power of judgement's assumption of the synthesizability of unsynthesized sensible manifoldness, cannot provide similar assurance. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, that Kant's transcendental deduction of the principle of the reflecting power of judgement were successful, that deduction would at most entail that a principle of reflection is transcendentally necessary for governing our understanding's Kant (1992) , Kant (1998), and Kant (2000) .
2 'The principle of the formal purposiveness of nature is a transcendental principle of the power of judgment' (Kant 2000: 68; KU, 5.181, caption, my emphasis) . 3 Kant, to be sure, calls the intuitive intellect's representation of the whole or of the Real a 'synthetic universal' (Kant 2000: 276; KU, 5.407) . But the sense of synthesis involved in this characterization is one of which we are in principle incapable of giving a positive characterization. The negative characterization we are capable of giving is that such combination has nothing to do with our way of synthesizing. Accordingly, the intuitive intellect's access to the manifoldness of intuition is 'non-synthetic'.
